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THE SEL;GBI-PHIKWE STRIXE, BOTSWANA, 1975: 
THE STATE, MINE WORKERS AND THE MULTINATIONALS 
David Cooper 
The Strike Event* l 
In 1959, seven years before Botswana' S independence, the Chief of the "Ngwato ~ribal) 
Reserve" negotiated a concession agreement with the Rhodesian Selection Trust l now Roan 
Selection   rust) to prospect for minerals in that area. RST controlled a major share 
of the copper production at the the in Northern Rhodesia (~ambia) . By 1967, the 
copper-nickel deposits at the two cattle posts of Selebi and Phikwe, fifteen kilometers 
apart, seemed the most promising of numerous other mineral finds (optima, 1972: 63-67). 
In 1972, construction began and the mine came on stream in 1974. The initial 
estimated capital costs were R107 million for the private mine complex anti R53 million 
for the pvernment controlled general infrastructure. By 1976 this had escalated to 
R272 million for the total capital costs which incluiied the mine and 
the infrastructure. (1) After considerable financial reorganization of the ownership 
of the mining enterprise, the end result was that by 1972 production was being 
undertaken by the locally incorporated company, Bamangwato Concessions Limited (BCL). 
The latter! S equity capital is owned 85% by Botswana RST Limited (BRST) , with the 
remaining 15% being the Botswana government's free share as provided for in the 1959 
original concession agreement (Master Agreement, 1972 : 1-2). BRST f S equity is itself 
controlled: (a) by a 307h shareholding of American Metal Climax (Amax), which company 
has a major shareholding in RST in Zambia a d  is listed as one of the nine largest USA 
multinationals engaged in non-petroleum mineral extraction; (b) by a 3077 shareholding 
of the Anglo-American ~orporation/~harter Consolidated Group, which has extensive 
southern African interests and. also controls the De Beers (~otswana) company,which has 
undertaken extremely profitable diamond mining in Orapa and LetThakane in the 1970s; 
and (c) 40% by small shareholders, mostly the general public of the USA. (2) 
Besides the actual mining complex, the general infrastructure financed by 
the Botswana government by means of foreign loans (see below) included (a) new rail 
and road linkages; (b) a power station adjacent to the mine, burning coal from the 
mine at Morupule in Botswana, specifically developed by an Anglo-American subsidiary 
for this project; (c) a dam at the Shashe river and an 80 km. pipeline to the water 
works in Phikwe (3) ; (d) a township and supportive municipal services. The town was 
designed for an initially estimated population of 12,000 in the township and adjacent 
ffSite and Servicetf area if own Pl- Report, 1970: appendix 2). By 1975, this 
township had a population of around 11,000. Ever since construction first began, 
however, people had spontaneously formed a village-style residence in f%otshabeloff 
("a place of refuge") near the mine site, and this population had swelled to over 
- 144 - 
8,000 (~eport of the Census of Selebi-Phikwe, 1975: preface). 
On 29th July 1975, Botswana experienced the most serious strike in its labour 
history so far. (4) Discontent, which focussed on the annual wage increments exgected 
at the end of that month (~uly), culminated in the temporary adjournment of 
negotiations between a delegation of mine workers and the BCL management on the 
afternoon of the 28th. Early the next day, when the shift was to take over, some 
of the workers closed the main gates of the mine. Others entered the mine to inform 
the workers therein to join the strike, so as to facilitate a complete shutdown of 
production. In this connection, they evicted expatriate staff from the smelter 
plant and other departments and caused minor damage to some buildings by breaking 
windows. Outside the mine, m a n y  groups of workers went into the township and 
Botshabelo, to notify others of the strike. Some groups, carrying sticks,also 
attempted to round up all the BCL marked cars, used by many of the expatriate staff, 
and drive them to be left just outside the mine gates. In the process, some cars 
were damaged and stones were thrown at the personnel superindendentfs car, and a 
number of unpopular expatriates were assaulted. Some of the doctors and nurses were 
evicted from the BCL clinic and only the presence of an alsatian dog prevented 
strikers breaking into the BCLfinanced primary school. 
A unit of the para-military Police Mobile Unit arrived from Francistown (5). 
At noon, the Vice President arrived from klorone with two other Ministers and 
attempted to address an estimated crowd of over 2,000 assembled at the gates (~otswana 
Daily News, 1975,a). When he began to raise the issue of the smelter - that if 
technicians had not managed to shut it down operation of the mine could have been 
halted for over a year - he was shouted down and abused. The chairman of the local 
Mine Workers' Union was also shouted down. The PMU moved in and dispersed the crowd 
with teargas. 
PMU reinforcements were airlifted into the area, which came under heavy police 
security for some days. On the 30th most of the expatriate workers resumed maintenance 
work, while all the 2,800 Batswana were told to report at the personnel offices the 
following day. Here they were slectively reinstated on the basis of lists drawn up by 
the various (expatriate) heads of departments, 622 losing their jobs. (6) 180 people 
were detained by the police and later released on bail. Eventually, two months after 
the strike, 60 male and 2 female former BCL workers went on trial, "charged alternatively 
with rioting, intimidation and malicious damage to property1'. In December, 34 were 
convicted and received jail sentences from 3 to 12 months (~otswana Daily News, 1975, 
b, c, d). 
In the President's broadcast to the nation t"e day after the strike, he had 
stated that "the Company is not obliged to re-employ av of the workers". (7) Much of 
the ensuing debate during the following twelve months focussed on this local issue. 
The President himself, when he came to address workers in Phikwe in December, after the 
trial had ended, sta.ted he never intended to give the Company an excuse, lleconomic or 
otherwise ,.. to weed out the people they did not like prior to the disturbances" 
(speech . . . 19th December 1975 : 5). Although the opposition parties called for a 
commission of enquiry (~otswana Daily News, 1976 b), the Government adopted an approach 
of informal discussions which eventually led to half of those originally sacked being 
reinstated. By the time of the annual BNWU conference at the end of 1976 in Phikwe, 
the atmosphere was one of letting matters rest. (8) 
None the less, the strike did raise much broader issues which the President 
did elaborate on in his two speeches, but which were never publicly debated thereafter. 
In December his speech was more conciliatory to the workers, mentioning the tardiness 
in localization of BCL posts as well as grievances about race relations in the town - 
not raised in the earlier address. The latter, however, deals more concisely with the 
three issues on which this paper will focus. It is useful to quote these extensively: 
(Issue one) .. . The mine has been running at a loss of R3 million a 
month and just when it appeared that the various technical 
problems were nearly solved, the irresponsible action of 
a handful of Batswana has caused a complete close 
down . . . it is essential for Botswanat S development 
that we should retain foreign investment and attract 
much more such investment. It is also necessary for 
us to import expatriate skills to aid us in our 
development. This can only be done if the companies 
who invest here obtain a reasonable return on their 
investments and if the skilled expatriates feel that 
their lives and property are safe ... illegal and 
unnecessary strikes have continued to such an extent 
that Botswana will lose its reputation as a stable and 
safe country in which to invest money ... 
(~ssue two) . . . The number of Batswana employed in mining and 
industry constitutes a very small part of our total 
labour force. For every Motswana who is employed in 
these sectors there are at least five others who would 
like to be similarly employed but are forced to eke out 
a living in the m a l  areas or seek employment outside 
Botswana. My Government is committed to the sharing 
out of the revenue derived from mining and industry 
among all Batswana. A strike at Selebi-Phikwe, Orapa, 
Morupule or elsewhere, therefore, does not only harm 
the companies, who own the undertaking, but Botswana as 
a whole . . . 
(~ssue three) . . . The procedure for settling disputes is clearly laid 
down in our laws... I am aware that the large majority 
of workers do not wish to participate in these strikes 
but axe intimidated into doing so by a hard core of 
politically motivated individuals . . . [who] hope to 
reap political rewards from the chaos which could 
result.. . 
In focussing on these issues, this paper will not use the strike in order to ? 
understand the trade union history of Botswana - though such a study is still an 
urgent necessity. Rather, an attempt will be made to relate the strike event to the 
Srpe of social structure that is emerging in a Botswana considered as a structural part 
of the Southern African periphery. It is easy for title of this paper to evoke 
metaphors such as Itworking classtt or tturbanizationll, which mi&t derive some of their 
reality from contexts such as Western Europe. Botswana has, however, had "agrostads" 
of over 10,000 persons existing as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
and most of the Phikwe llworking class" is best conceived of as "absentee farmerstt. some 
discussion of the earlier social structures existing in Botswana is necessary so that 
the metaphors used later to describe the present class structure in Phikwe can derive 
their reality from this historical framework, and I have undertaken this in the full 
version of this paper. (see **His-torical Structures for summary.) 
The State - Multinational Relations 
In the first issue of the President's speech, he was quite realistic in his 
fear of upsetting foreign investors. For this to be appreciated, the relationship 
between the state and the multinationals must be examined in tern of the foreign 
economic networks which penetrate Selebi-Phikwe. The other two issues bear more 
directly on the workers' situation and will be dealt with later. 
The US Ambassador to the United Nations has recently stated: 
The United States has to do to help Africa some of the 
things it did in Europe at the end of the Second World War. 
Expansion of Communism was contained by a development 
through the Marshall Plan and I think that what we see now 
in Africa is the beginning of a development strategy for 
this continent which involves all the West, not just 
Western governments. 
(fi Andrew Young, in The Guardian, 1977: 8) 
This level of self-consciousness was seldom present when the Phihe 
negotiations began in 1968; none the less, the underlying structures and interests 
were, and it was these which the strike threatened. 
Amax, Anglo-American, and the smaller shareholders, provided around R36 mil.lion 
as equity share capital for the initial financing of the private mining complex 
 strander er, 1974: 541). The two rmnltinationals have since had to provide massive 
additional funding to keep the project alive because of recurrent technical problems. 
The total financial package incorporated a much wider net of "Westernw 
interests, however. R52 million for the mining enterprise was loaned at a low rate 
of interest (eh, Ostrander, 1974: 544) by an investment bank owned by the West German 
government and an associated consortium of German commercial banks. In return, BCL 
has signed a fifteen year contract to sell 55% of the nickel and all the copper to a 
large West German firm which stood as guarantee for that part of the West German bank 
loan not guaranteed by the Bonn Government (Master Agreement, 1972 : 5). The remaining 
nickel will also be sold in West Germany by BCL, thereby securing a copper and nickel 
supply for this country for 15 years  strander er, 1972: 541). However, before being 
sold in West Germany, the ore is first shipped from Botswana (via Mafeking, Johannesburg, 
Maputo) to the Amax refinery at Port Nickel in the USA for processing. This was of 
interest to Amax, who preferred this amangement to utilizing Zambian or South African 
refining facilities, since their Port Nickel plant was operating below capacity (~ewis, 
1974: 210). Even more important: this ore contains a @h Cobalt content, and since 
the USA has no domestic supply of this metal (externally obtained from Zaire, however), 
it is said the US Government was favourably disposed to the World Bank co-ordinating 
these loan agreements and overcoming the often complex difficulties. Some Pentagon 
Generals even recently visited Phikwe on "a study of strategic materialst1. 
The remaining principal loan finance for the private mining complex (~13.5 
million) was provided by the Industrial Development Corporation, an official 
investment bank of South Africa, at an even lower interest rate (690 ,  Ostrander, 1974: 
541). A condition for the loan was that the South African content of capital goods 
and services for the mine construction contracts totalled at least R13.5 million. (9) 
Like the renegotiated Customs Union agreement with Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland 
in 1969, relatively favourable terms fo&hese countries also imply increased economic 
linkages with South Africa, with political consequences. 
In addition to the private mining side, the loans for the infrastructure also 
exhibited this network of linkages. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) gave loans to the Botswana 
Government at little or no interest, towards the costs of the water and power 
facilities, respectively. Because the CIDA loan was tied to purchasing Canadian 
equipment for the power station, the costs were higher than would have occurred in a 
free market situation (~uisano . . . , 1972: 2). At the same time the Botswana 
Government did insist on the development of the local colliery at Morupule as opposed 
to the cheaper option of importing electrical power from South Africa or coal from 
South Africa or Rhodesia. 
A World Bank loan provided for much of the remaining infrastructure costs, 
though small grants came from the UK and Danish governments (world Bank . .. 1972: 
annex, 2). The Botswana Government put great emphasis on being financially responsible, 
through receipt of these loans, for this infrastructure, rather than it being developed 
by the mining company (as in 0rapa). Moreover, BCL entered into a longc-term agreement 
with the Government to pay water and power minimum rates (to the parastatal Water and 
Power ~orporations) , railww surcharges, and an annual "Township Contribution". This 
almost fully services the Government's debt commitments on the above loans. 
Few workers in Phikwe in 1976, including the trade union leadership, were 
found to make clear conceptual distinctions between the multinationals and foreign 
governments, nor between the foreign shareholders of BCL and the local expatriate 
technocracy. The dominant model current in people's minds was of "Whites &'Makgoa' 
Whites, the term used for expatriates] sent by their countries to steal the copper of 
Botswana", with their own Government seen as a passive or ineffectual bystander. The 
strikers thus acted out the strike on the stage of Selebi-Phikwe without a clear idea 
of the maze of networks within which they were caught. While this model might capture 
some of the spirit of their situation, an effective longc-term strategy would have to 
take into account a much more complex picture, including a Jsnowledge that an anti- 
nationalization clause had been included in the Master Agreement (1972: 49). If the 
workers were largely unaware of these complexities, some of the principal foreign 
actors were not. In a paper given to a Southern African conference, a leading Amax 
official stated: 
It has become an axiom of U.S. government and 
international development agencies that projects 
involving investment from several national sources I 
are to be preferred to projects having a single l 
national source of finance ... The finger of I 
nationalistic anger or political animosity is not as l 
apt to be pointed in several directions at once, as 
it is at a single-nationality investor ... The 
assurance given by multi-national sources of finavlce 
is only one of the protections for the outside 
investor that has been built into the structure of 
the Selebi-Pikwe deal . . . [moreover] Botswana has 
agreed in the Master Agreement] to submit any major 
disputes with the investor to arbitration by the new 
World Bank-sponsored International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (I.C.S .I.D.) . Any 
serious contravention of such arbitration, or a.ny 
unjustified tampering with the underlying security of 
the World Bank loan, would certainly jeopardize a 
government's access to further World Bank credit. 
 strander er, 1974: 543) 
It would be unfortunate if the above analysis is taken as full support for 
either a theory of conspiracy by the relevavlt actors or a theory of structural 
determinism whereby actors have no options open to them in the situation. This 
network of economic forces which affected the life chances of the Phikwe strikers in 
a largely hidden way was, after all, set up by human actors. When negotiations began 
from 1968 onwards, the present political uncertainty in Southern Africa could not have 
been a dominant factor. The negotiators for the multi-nationals were primarily 
interested in obtaining a rate of profit as good as or better than they might get 
elsewhere in the world - as well as having the long-term calculation of 
gaining a foothold ahead of any competitors in a country which geological finds of 
the 1960s were shown --to contain a vast mineral potential. A country like Germany - 
or rather the state apparatus in that society as an amalgam of a set of complementary 
and conflicting class interests existent there (including its own working class) - was 
obviously interested in a lonpterm supply of metals as well as generally increasing 
its interests in the area. (10) The aid organizations, and particularly the multitude 
of their local representatives in Botswana, are to some extent genuine in their desire 
to help what they perceive as a lppoor, non-racial Third World country". The latter 
paradigm, the conception of poverty and the abhorrence of apartheid in nearby South 
Africa, has a strong influence on all these organizations and undoubtedly also prevailed 
upon most of the foreign government and multi-national negotiators as well. This 
paradigm is not simply a rationalization of other interests, though an effect of this 
world view is to reinforce the hidden nature of these linkages. 
What is important is that there are "boundary conditions" which set limits 
on these negotiators, i.e. there is a region of choices Itout of bounds". As the Amax 
representative put it : 
. . . practically none of the capital being loaned to the 
Botswana govermnerd for the purpose of cona.tmcting this 
infrastructure would have been w d e  available to it, if 
it were not for the existence of the private mining 
enterprise. 
(~strader, 1974: 541) 
I have argued in the historical section (**) that during the colonial period. the 
earlier mode of production retained mayl3r of its essential features. If one can talk 
about a crossroads period for a mode of production, this is psobably true for Botswana 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s period, when moves towards independence began to 
take shape. The Bri-tish administration was more favourably inclined to the Botswana 
Democratic Party (BDP), which has since independence had a parliamentary majority, than 
it was to the chief-orientated factions,on the one hand, or what it perceived as the 
"Pan-Africanist" factions, on the other  a alp ern, 1965: 285-297). In terns of foreign 
policy, a main thrust of the BDP has been to try to extricate itself as much as 
possible from the economic and political networks directed from Pretoria. (11) It has 
never so far had a theoretical perspective which could assess whether it was not simply 
trying to incorporate itself in an alternative network with nearly equal dangers. In 
the 1960s the attempts to move away from South Africa were fairly progressive in the 
Southern African context, and it could be argued that a more radical stance by the BDP 
would have been squashed by foreign intrigues, as in Lesotho. 
In the 1960s the degsee to which this BDP receptiveness to the above Western 
aid was influenced by the objective economic interests of the factions supporting it - 
as against the influence of ideological determinants (anti-apartheid attitudes, inter- 
nationalization of a specific world view derived from Western educational influences, 
etc.) - cannot be gone into here. As a minimum, it could be said some factions 
intuitively realized in the 1960s that this external economic network would at least 
not _harm_ their interests. After more than a decade of incorporation, however, the 
external networks have helped to shape the intermal class structure. As will be shown 
below, the strike revealed classes which threaten this finely balanced network, however 
unintentionally they do so. Similarly, the paper has really only been talking so far 
about - multinational relationships. The broadening of the former 
into a concept of the !'State apparatus" which responds to and. processes demmds from the 
internal class structure can only be dealt with in relation to the strike after a class 
analysis is made below. 
It should be stressed that these Phihe networks are not an isolated case 
and thus such a strike has wide ramifications. Throughout Botswana the predominant 
British colonial influence has slowly been augmented by influences from North America, 
Western lkmpe and Scandinavia. (12) The operation of the Lom6 Convention and the way 
in which the &mopean Econoaic Community reduced the import levy on Botswana beef in 
1975 by 9Ojj because it threatened to harm the country9s economy are replications of the 
coppex+nickel story, with cattle this time. (13) Nor has this led to underdevelopment 
in the sense of an actual falling of real income. What has occurred, at least in the 
Botswana case, has been distorted development within a situation of a rising standard 
of living for virtually everyone in the post-independence decade. The strike took place 
within this context of Pising expectations. In the light of the earlier colonial 
history of Botswana, what Sweezy says of Cuba could just as well have been said of 
Botswana: 
We were, we [~weezy and ~uberman] wrote in the spring of 
1960, struck again and again during our sta;y in Cuba by 
Ithe extent to which rapid and important results could be 
obtained merely by eliminating the worst abuses and wastes 
of the old orderf. To put %he point in different terms, 
there was a very large unused (or abused) potential in the 
Cuban economy and society- . . . 
(sweezy and Magdof f, 1974.: 18) 
This occurred even more so in Phikwe than the rest of Botswana, with the 
massive injection of modern machinery (embodying "dead labour1' from ou-tsi.de Botswana) 
and the utilizing of local labour which was previously either underemployed in the 
rural areas or employed in South Africa. Nor is the President wrong about some of the 
economic benefits made available from Phikwe which the strike could have jeopardized. 
Revenues for the government are obtained from (a) corporate profit taxation, (b) 
royalties and dividends (the Government" 155% share), (c) Taxation of wage income, (a) customs duties on m i n i n g  imports, (e) interest from the various power, water, etc., 
surcharges. (14) 
It is proclaimed pvement policy to utilize these revenues in pursuing its 
policy -of the primacy of rural development (National Development Plan, 1973: Part I), 
and customs duties during the construction phase were considerable. However, owing mainly 
to world inflation, the poor metal prices on the world market, engineering design I 
mistakes, and technical problems concerning ore extraction, the mine has been running I 
at an enormous, unanticipated loss. It could be argued that in this venture, at least 
so far, the multinationals have lost more than Botswana! (15) Moreover, in what was 
to be Botswana~s next major mining project, Amax has declined to take up its option to 
develop salt and soda ash production in 19'76 at the Sua Pan, both for economic reasons 
and because of political uncertainty prevailing in Southern Africa. The recent budget 
proposals also reduce the period in which capital mining costs are written off for tax l 
purposes : 
The Government sees this proposal as a clear 
indication that it is looking for investment on a 
large scale in the development of Botswana~s mineral 
resources. 
(B-t Speech, 1977: item 73) 
Other amenhents to the 1972 Master Agreement are also in the pipeline (~udget 
Speech.1977: item 20). This development path thus acquires its own momentum and 
constraints. A series of strikes in the urban areas during the few years prior to the 
Phikwe strike had already made the government sensitive. Thus,four months before the 
strike, the Botswana Daily lTews headlined the speech of the outgoing Phikwe branch 
chairman of the Botswana Mine Workers1 Union, in which he called for proper procedures 
to be followed prior to strike action, as llIllegal Strikes in Phikwe rappedt1 (1975 f). 
A month before the strike, a feature article followed: llOur Trade Unions ... are they 
coming or goingt1 (~otswana Daily News, 1975 g). There were deeper causes in Phikwe, 
however, besides urban llinstabilityl' and "Trade Unionsll, related to this form of 
distorted development mentioned - in particular (a) the expatriate situation and (b) 
the Phikwe class structure, both generated by the external economic networks just 
described. 
Phikwe Miners - a ~abour Aristocracy? 
The President's second oint viewed the mine workers as a "labour 
aristocracyll (cf Waterman 1-e appeal was for them to temper their wage demands 
because this could result in similar claims being made by civil servants and others in 
wage employment, thereby (a) creating a llhigh wage-low volume of employment1' phenomenon 
in the urban sector, (b) increasing the rural-urban wage gap, the volume of migration 
to the towns, and urban unemployment, and (c) decreasing the nett governmental revenues 
available for rural development. (16) This point can be considered in relation to the 
two aspects of distorted development mentioned above. 
(i) The Expatriate Situation"*+ 
(ii) The Phikwe Internal Class Structure 
A whole set of issues hinted at above, including this form of distorted 
development, require this analysis before the actual role played in the strike by various 
strata can be interpreted. This analysis cannot be detailed, but at the sane time it 
also cannot ignore the situation of the urban wage sector in general nor the articulation 
of the Phikwe class structure with the rural mode of production. (17) 
The six large ttagrostad" capitals of what wed to be the major tribal 
gtReserves" (now "~istricts") have steadily increased their role in the twentieth 
cenhuy as centres of trade and. local government. (28) Shultaneously,%ere has been 
a tendency for some people to make their homes permanently at the lands, for economic 
and social reasons, and. abandon their village residence (~ilitshena, 1976 b). If the 
populations of the other two large villages that have emerged along the railwa~r line 
are included with these six, the de facto populations of these ei&t rural centres made 
up 15% of the total village plus lands plus cattle-post population of Botswana in 
1971. (19) On the other hand, 72Oh of the total Bats population were in 
rural settlements with a population of under 1000 person e Rural Income 
Distribution Sumey found the median rural income per month of households in these ei&t 
centres to be 1773, as against P50 for the rest of the rural population, (21) The rural 
population must, therefore, be seen as stratified in pat by the large village/small 
village-lm-ds-cattle post gradation, and this itself reflects the ethnic-politico 
"state fomtionW of each Reserve, discussed in the "Historical Structures" section. 
A characteristic of colonial undlexdevelopment was %hat in 1960 wage employment 
in the tTrotectorate" was only around 13,000, more or less evenly distributed between 
government, agriculture (mostly European farms), trade and industry, and domestic 
service (cf HaXpern, 1965: 307). In the colonial administration there was no policy 
of localization at all until 1961 (~mit, -1970: 67), and in 1960 s d y  41 out of the 
597 persons in the clerical and higher grades of the administration were Batswana 
t alpe ern, 1965: 313). 
In 1963, it was decided to move from the old colonial headquarters in 
Mafeking (20 miles south of the border, in South ~frica!) and to construct the new 
capital at Gabomne, then a police post. By 1975 Gaborone had a population of around 
35,000 (~tephem, 1976: 19). Fsancistown, the old commercial centre of the Tati 
Cornpm in the north-east, had more than doubled its population since 1964, as had 
Lobatse, the centre of the beef export industry since 1954. If one includes the 
populations of Selebi-Philrwe and Orapa with these three, this population, as 
the 1971 census defines it, has grown from around 20,000 in 1964 to just over 95,000 
in 1975, this population now being 14% of the total BoLswana population (~anhanen, 
1976: 2). 
Although there is no clear definition of "urbantt as opposed to "large 
villagett, what djstingtaishes the two is really the predominance of mid-twentieth century 
forces of production (technology) underpinning the econoqy of these "towns" and 
thereby influencing the social relations of production existent there. (22) By 1975 
wage employment in what is termed the "formal sectorw included nearly 48,000 B~tswana 
cftizem, i.e. around 2% of al.1 Botswana citizens between the economically "activett 
ages of 15 to 54. (23) These (nearly) 48,000 were employed as follows (24): 
State Sectors 43h 
Msling and Quarrying 7% 
Manufature and Constmtion 18% 
Agriculture 7% 
Commerce and Finance, Transport and Services 25% 
Moreover, a total of nearly 64% of all this wage employment was in the 
"towns" and another 18% i.n rural District government service (derived from Employment 
Survey, Awgust 1975s 1976: 6). Two factors stand out, therefore, in Botswana's 
development since 1960: (i) the growth of wage employment in the towns; (ii) the 
incorporation of a large nmber of the employed into the various state sectors. The 
latter has been made possible partly by the expansion of secondary school facilities - 
in 1960, of the meagre 561 children attending secondary school in the tlProtectoratetl, 
half were in the first form and only l8 sitting for their matriculation  alper ern, 1965: 
311) The' fact that besides these 48,000 there were nearly 8,000 domestic servants 
and gardeners in Botswana, according to the 1971 Census (1972: Table 29), points to 
the distorted nature of some of this development. 
Selebi-Phikwe is in many ways a microcosm of this development. A rough 
estimate for the number of Batswana in employment in Selebi-Phikwe in April 1975 was 
as follows (25) 
Mining (BCL) 2800 
Manufacture, Engineering, Construction 1200 
State Sectors 700 
commerce and Finance, Transport and Services 700 
Domes tic Servants,, Gardeners 1000 
Batswana aged 15-54 who stated they were not 
formally employed (two-thirds female) 4500 
Total Batswana aged 10+ in Phikwe l0900 
In trying to conceptualize the class structure from this mass of employment 
figures, it is useful to begin with a breakdown of wage divisions; then introduce 
relevant economic and cultural factors, including the positions occupied by 
different g~oups in the production/distribution process; and, finally, relate 
1 
workers' articulation with the rural mode of production. What one is looking for I 
ultimately is a clarification of which groups will tend to emerge, as well as form 
alliances with other such groups, in order to pursue their material interests in 
obtaining or increasing their segment of the total economic product - in a struggle 
which ranges from informal economistic exchanges to fully-fledged political l 
organization. 
A breakdown of wage employment divisions for citizens in Botswana as a whole 1 
was as follows in 1975 (26): 
llStratum all "Stratum b lf llStratum cl1 
wage/month P 1-100 P 101-P 200 above P 200 
Non-State Sectors 89% 97 p'% 
State Sectors 77% 17% 6% 
It will be shown that in Selebi-Phikwe these break-points are significant, 
and they have thus been divided here as Strata a, b, c. Because Government employment 
forms a large proportion of total wage employment, because other state sectors and 
mining follow the government wage levels closely, and because other private industries 
do not diverge greatly, these strata levels can be said to have significance throughout 
the country (if break-points are taken as a rough guide). 
BCL divides all lllocalll workers into Grades One to Eight. The breakdown 
was as follows (27): 
llStratum a" "Stratum b" "Stratum cfl 
Grades Grades 1-3 Grades 4-6 Grades 6-8 
-/month P 40-80 P 85-200 above P 200 
78% 2007 %!h 
One factor reinforcing mere income levels in Selebi-Phikwe (and in ~aberone) 
is the allocation of Government, Pmastatal and BCL housing in the tomship, according to 
income level. The planned Phikwe township (i.e. excluding ~otshabelo) has the main 
road running from west to east and cutting the township in two, with the shopping mall 
ri&t in the centre. The north side contains lllaw costw houses in which BCL grades 
1-3 live as well as a few "stratum a" state sector employees. Still on this side but 
near the mall (and extending westwards) and just across the road (south) near the mall 
(an& extending eastwards) is a belt of llmedium costf1 houses. All the BCL grades 4-6 
are eligible for housing in these north side houses, which have been supplied with 
electricity, which are better finished on the outside than the other BCL "low costu 
houses, and which western region has been coined wOrlando" after the relativelywup- 
gradedu area of the African township of Soweto, Johannesburg. "Stratum bl' state sec-tor 
employees live in this belt on both sides of the road. Further south on the south 
side are the '!hi& costf1 houses in which expatriates and some of the Batswana 
llstratum c" BCL and state sector employees live. 
l 
A cultural factor is relevant, however. There tends to be some social 
separation (for example, attendance at public bars versus "shebeenstl in private houses) 
S between educated and less educated Batswana in Phikwe - which is complex, but if one 
wants a crude cut-off point it is the completion of three years of secondary school 
' (the "Junior Certificate1' examination). I 
This is reflected in the housing situation. There is the Government 
distinction between "industrial class1' and "stafff1, whose conditions of service are 
different and with only the latter eligible for government housing. Some of the 
former are skilled workers (e.g. painters) who actually can earn above P 100 (i.e. 
stratum b) , while the entry point for the lowest 'lstaff" grade (clerical and typists 
is the Junior Certificate pass, with the starting salary around P 60 (i.e. stratum a]. (28) 
In BCL it is basically the that matters. Yet in Orlando there tends to be 
informal differences. Many of the grade 4-6 workers are relatively uneducated, often 
having been 'lboss-boysl' or other semi-skilled workers in the South African mines. BCL 
has been able to utilize this, and they have often become "shift bosses", "heavy 
machine operatorsf1, etc., in Phikwe. Many of these grade fours, earning as they do 
between P 85 and P 100, actually live in the "low cost" housing area, while some of 
the clerical grade threes have "medium cost1' housing. On the other hand, research 
showed the local trade union leadership at the time of the strike was predominantly 
from the educated sector of grades 4-6. There is also a tendency for educated grade 
sixes to obtain housing across the road in the south side. However, since m a n y  of the 
less educated BCL grades 4-6 are attempting to give their children a good education 
(personal interviews), this division is not reproducing itself. 
In 1976 no expatriates at all lived on the north side of the main road. 
After 1968, when the original township plans were drawn up, there was an attempt by 
some expatriate government planners, who anticipated what they perceived to be a 
facto racialist divide emerging in the housing, to create a more integrated housing 
system. With BCL management and some other groups against this, the Cabinet decision 
eventually opted for relatively minor adjustments. (29) The effect of the external 
networks in shaping the internal structure is thus direct in this case. 
It can be seen that, in terms of consciousness, housing selection and role 
in the production process, what is termed here the lower level (stratum 'u) bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie is separated off from other workers. Their actual productive role is 
important: there is a group of JC (~unior certificate) or higher educated workers who 
are being trained by BCL and the State as skilled artisans, and their production role 
and relations with other workers makes them better conceived of as part of the latter. 
Higher level technical supervisors (e.g. senior shift foremen) are postulated, however, 
as part of the Btratum c, high level bureaucratic bourgeoisie (see Table 1 for the way 
the initial wage level strata have thus been transformed). 
Nearly half the population of Selebi-Phikwe live outside the planned township, 
in the unplanned Botshabelo and the Site and Service area established south of thenhi& 
costf1 housing area in 1975. This scheme is really a "planned BotshabeloI1, with a plot 
being provided for the household to construct a dwelling (sometimes of brick/zinc, 
sometimes mud/thatch), water stand-pipes and a road network also being provided. 
Botshabelo is now being similarly developed. Selebi-Phikwe is not unique in having 
these "peri-urban" areas, as they are termed; 75% of the population of Francistown and 
25% of that of Gaborone live in such areas (~eri-urban Survey, 1974: ii). 
About 2% of all BCL employees live in Botshabelo, primarily to avoid the 
P 4 per month rent for "low cost1' BCL housing and also so as to have the security of 
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wage grades. (30) I f  they do not l ive with a relative i n  town, most of the government 
industrial class live i n  these two peri-urban areas. So do many of the construction 
and engineering unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the domestic servants, and various 
workers in  shops and other commercial establishments. A t  the time of the strike, the 
wages of the lowest unskilled BCL and government workers were both P 40 per month. 
This was alwqs higher than the wages of unskilled workers i n  these other sectors, 
with some domestic servants and shop assistants even falling below P 20. Thus, 
although most persons i n  these peri-urban areas are part of stratum a, there are levels 
of gradation amongst the poor, with the unemployed a t  the bottom. 
Besides the employed i n  Phikwe, one has to consider the self-employed, 
broadly divided into ( i )  traders of various levels, ( i i )  petty commodity producers. (31) 
The la t te r  i n  Phikwe and Botswana as a whole are not numerous, the economic and 
cultural domination of South Africa having resulted i n  the importation of tinned foods, 
clothes, household utensils, etc. Thus most are involved i n  trade of some sort. 
Women - single, widowed, or the wives of workers (including those i n  BCL low cost 
housing and Orlando) - are heavily involved i n  beer brewing, retailing commercial 
beer, and the sale of meat and beer a t  parties (llmotsheloll). In 1976, with reasonable 
application, a t  least P 30 per month could be made by such women, the really 
enterprising even penetrating into stratum b. In Phikwe (but the rwzal areas), 
re ta i l  trade i s  s t i l l  dominated by expatriates and some local citizen Asians. Batswana 
are mostly small scale hawkers, vendors and taximen of stratum a or b, though a few 
large traders have emerged, definitely of stratum c. 
Besides the factors discussed above, differentiating stratum a as a whole from 
i3tltatum b, the most important i s  actually their articulation with the rural mode of pro- 
duction: for most workers in  Botswana towns are objectively and subje_ctively s t i l l  mimai'lt 
easants who own their own means of production and accumulation. Crucial to this are 
The factors discussed earlier, of Botswana history and social structure: ( i )  very 
l i t t l e  land. alienation, l i t t l e  land shortage and ease of obtaining arable land slmply 
by applying to the headman; ( i i )  the type of arable farming which, except for 
ploughing, can be done entirely by women; ( i i i )  the herdsmen system of catt le care. 
In this situation m a n y  of the male workers in  Phikwe were leaving their  
wives and children behind i n  the village, the wife assisted by kin working on the 
lands and coming to Phikwe for v i s i t s  or af ter  the harvest. This was economical and 
also reinforced by a culture of migrant labour generated over decades of men going 
to the South African mines. For most, the past decade of town development i n  eastern 
Botswana has simply been to "transport" wage employment opportunities there instead 
of these existing across the South African border - the village s t i l l  remains the base. 
For people i n  the low-cost housing and peri-urban areas, rural agriculture was a major 
w a ~  of making ends meet and a security (food supply) i f  they lost  their job. Although 
some of the more educated stratum b workers were bringing their  wives (often also 
fairly educated) to Phikwe, many were also employing tracto-owners to plot@ for them 
and hiring people to assist  i n  the harvest, the wife being a general supervisor a t  the 
lands. This was even more so with cattle: although the Rural Income Distribution 
Survey found 45% of rural households owning no catt le a t  a l l  (1976: 110), i t  was hard 
to find in  Selebi-Phikwe a married male worker i n  stratum b who had no catt le,  or who 
was not a t  least planning to buy soon. (32) With the "going ratef1 for herdsmn being 
P 12 or ' less per month i n  1976 (with benefits of milk and catt le for use 2n p lowing  
included i n  this l1mafisal1 system, and perhaps a calf a year as well), those i n  
stratum b or c were situated i n  an advantageous exchange network with those permanently 
i n  the rural areas. 
The urban worker/rural peasant dichotow m u s t  thus be seen to be false. The 
only adults found. to be significantly committed solely to the urban areas were some 
single or divorced women. Workers i n  stratum b and above tend to be, or are becoming, 
richer farmers as well, and hence are a "labour i n  two senses. This form 
of mining development i s  thus reinforcing this tendency significantly. 
What of stratum a? It can be recalled that the Rural Income Distribution 
found the median income (including transfers from urban workers) to be P 73 and P 50 
per month for large villa@? and small village/lands/cattle post households, 
respectively - not therefore significantly different from an employed unskilled worker 
in Phikwe, who would be earning P 20 to P 50 per month, whose crops probably failed 
because of lack of rain in December 1976, and who never can save enough money to 
accumulate cattle. The latter point is crucial, since, although a person earning 
P 50 to PUDmight begin to buy some cattle, the recurrent droughts, the loss of 
animals because of poor herdsmanship, and the often numerous dependants draining his 
income make it difficult to "take-offn with cattle. This crucial dividing line between 
stratum a and stratum b, where the latter's level of wages makes cattle accumulation 
a reasonable possibility, is given added support by the fact that the upper levels of 
stratum a provided the core elements in the strike (~mitted). 'l ~ 
Since the above P 50 for small villages is a median, there must be 300/~4P/o 
of these households (for convenience, termed stratum X) situated outside both the towns 
and the eight large villages that are very poor indeed. Initial impressions from some 
of the data collected suggest many of the BCL and government semi-skilled 
workers earning P 45 to P 100, come from the villages of Botswana of over 1000 
persons, which only make up 28% of the de facto rural population. If this proves 
correct, this stratum X is even worse off in having relatively fewer members of their 
households serving them as target workers in the towns. (33) In addition, 56% of the 
Selebi-Phikwe population came to Phikwe from Districts within a 250 kilometre radius 
and which contain only three of the eight large villages (cf Sociological and. Housing 
Attitudes . . . 1975: 162); and a larger proportion of this group tend to be the 
unskilled workers predominating in the peri-urban areas. (34) Similar trends are 
discernible in Prancistown and Gaborone, Thus there is another very poor stratum a (l), 
living generally in the peri-urban areas, unemployed or employed below P 45, often in 
non-government and non-mine sectors, who themselves come from the poorer rural areas. 
Some of their household members are continually flowing back and forth during 
different periods of the agricultural cycle, involved in various enterprises I 
simultaneously, simply to make ends meet: lands and few/no cattle, unskilled 
employment &/or self-employment. Stratum X and stratum a (l), one rural, the other 
peri-usban rural, are the very poor of Botswana,. The semi-skilled and skilled 
workers, stratum a (2) earning from P 45 to the P 100-P 120 range, are relatively better 
off, but because they are generally unable to accumuiate significant agricultural 
capital in the form of cattle, should thus be included within the broad term of 
"Third World poortf, stratum a. 
Actors in the Strike 
* This paper is an extract from the initial draft of a longer one of the same title, 
to be published in 1978. Relevant omitted sections are indicated. Some points 
below have been further elaborated in the final draft, particularly (i) the role 
pla~red by national (metropole) social formations as a base from which multi- 
nationals conduct their international activities and (ii) the relative weighting 
of factors structuring the Phikwe internal class structure, especially wage 
levels versus role in the production process. The final synthesis has, however, 
been included by means of Table 1. 
** Historical Structures omitted: discusses tributary mode of production of the 
four dominant Tswana chiefdoms, their ethnic-politico structure and underlying 
relations of production centred on household lands am3 cattle activities; the 
maintenance of many of these structures through the creation of "Reserves" during 
colonial rule, the emergence of the q'Protectoratefl as a labour reserve for South 
African capital, and the traisformation of this status, after independence, throu 
the penetration primarily of llWesteml' based capital and, secondarily, of South 
African based capital. 
. . 
+* The Ekpatriate Situation omitted: their occupational structure ; racist practices 
and the strikers' attacks on cars, clinic, etc., in response to thl's; asld 
Government income policy in relation to what is termed llexpatriate/localll 
differentiation. 
**** Actors in the Strike omitted: Botswana trade union laws and Phikwe union 
structure; the role of Union in the strike, the leading role of stratum a.2 
underground workers and their reference to South African mine wages; the 
relationship between the state and "power bloc" of dominant internal classes 
and its reflection in the state's strong-arm crushing of the strike. 
Notes 
(1) When Botswana changed her currency from the South African Rand (R) to the Pula (P) (tied to the ~ollar) in late August 1976, one Rand = one Pula = 1.16 US 
Dollars. The initial estimates quoted (optima, 1972: 63) have escalated because 
of world inflation and technical problems (see later). These latest figures in 
March 1976 were announced in parliament (~otswana Daily News, 1976 a). It should 
be noted that in 1969 Botswana~s gmss domestic product was about R48 million, 
and total exports in 1970 only ~ 1 6  million, mainly meat and livestock products 
from the cattle industry  strander er, 1974: p. 535). 
(2) Cf Lewis, 1974: 158-160. This study provides a valuable analysis of the whole 
financial structure of the mining enterprise. The USA general public origin. 
information is obtained from discussions with BCL. 
(3) For convenience, the shortened term used by people in Selebi-Phikwe will be used. 
The tomship and mine works have actually been constructed at Phihe. The other 
mine shaft has already been sunk at Selebi and. production is expected to begin 
there in 1979. 
(4) This account draws on personal interviews conducted informally during 1976, when 
the author was engaged in another study project concerning Phikwe workers' 
migration patterns and economic linkages with the rural areas, and which involved 
residence in the township throughout that year and the collection of 160 life 
histories of these workers. Botswana Daily News reports of the strike were also 
used, as were notes and an unpublished paper by Diane Cooper (1976), who 
interviewed some of the strikers. 
Botswana has no army. 
This figure and the later figure of the numbers subsequently re-employed were 
obtained from the Labour Off ice, Selebi-Phikwe, in December 1976. 
This speech was printed in full in the Botswana Daily News on 31st July 1975. 
Personal attendance at the hearing of various delegates' speeches. 
Tricomf Fertiliser of South Africa also negotiated a longc-term contract for 
supply of two-thirds of the sulphw, a by-product from the Smelter process. 
Since then, a major local industry, the Gaborone-based brewery, has been 
established with German company participation. In 1977 a leading German firm 
of industrial consultants has been engaged to assist with t2ie Ministry of 
Commerce 1 S industrial study (~otswana Daily News, 1977a). 
cf Henderson, 1974, who assesses Botswanals independence purely in these terms. 
yf ~illery(1974: 166),in which a list of Foreign Aid for development in 1972-73 
1s given. 
The Lom6 Convention, 1975, between the EEC and countries of Africa, the Caribbean 
and the Pacific Ocean (ACP). This beef export crisis is outlined in Chiepe (1975). 
cf Lewis, 1974, for a cost-benefit analysis. 
This mine is at a competitive advantage, however, with aqy other world copper 
mine which might be started now at the much higher capital costs prevailing in 
the late 1970s. With the Selebi and two other possible nearby ore deposits still 
to be mined, and with the copper price potentially still to rise, enormous profits 
could still be made. 
The President 1s Speech (19th December 1975 : 3) briefly makes these points, which 
themselves have their origin in the dominant development paradigm adhered to by 
planners in Botswana. This paradigm was elaborated on by the consultant Professor 
Ghai (1971), the Government 1 S National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and 
Profits (1972), the Rural Development Report (chambers and Feldman, 1973), and 
the National Development Plan 1973-78 (1973). 
This summary here is derived from data obtained by interviewing the 160 workers 
drawn from skilled and unskilled miners and households in the "Site and Service" 
area. The statistics to be obtained from these "life historyt1 interviews are 
yet not available, but some of the main trends are apparent. 
Serowe, bnye, Molepolole,Maun, Mochudi, and Ramotswa. 
The two are Mahalapye and Palapye, thereby giving the eight villages in Botswana 
which had a de facto population of over 5000 in late August 1971, the period after 
the harvest when the 1971 Census hoped to find the maximum number of persons 
actually back from the lands living in the villages (~e~ort of the Population 
103). De facto = people actually living at the place of enumeration. 
out of 501,328, computed from pages 103 and 97, respectively. 
i.e. 360,981 out of 501,328, computed from pages 98 aYld 97, respectively. 
Computed from i ~ n n u a l  income figures of The Rural Income Distribution Survey in 
Botswana, 1974/75 (1976: 88). Although this survey! S statistics should only be 
taken as a fough guide (because of response error, particularly), it was 
theoretically extremely rigorous. It covered a stratified sample of over 1800 
out of the 93,000 rural households, interviewed rural households each month for 
12 months, and included a wide definition of income (e.g. income in kind, income 
from livestock in terms of a "weight gained" concept,transferred income from 
absent members, imputed rental benefit from owner occupied housing, etc.). The 
figures quoted are for llGr~ss Available Incomeff to the household "after deducting 
ordinary running expenses le .g. cost of seed] (excluding depreciation) and after 
deducting household taxes" (1976: 23). 
"Predominance" because, although the large "agro~tads~~ have developed a few craft 
industries and commercial structures (e .g. baulks), with even some tractors 
beginning to be used for ploughing, the earlier forces and social relations of 
production still predominate. 
(23) This usss the 1971 Census figure of 235,919 (1972: 135) for all citizens aged 
15-54 present in Botswana. Some people above 54 are employed, aYld the figure 
is for 1971, not 1975. However, this will not greatly affect the 20h proportion. 
(24) Computed from Employment Survey, August 1975 (1976: 2). The survey excludes 
seasonal employment on the "Tribal Landsn, i.e. "Agriculture" only includes wage 
employment on the 189 commercial farms (1976: 7). The llinformal secto,rff is also 
excluded. The survey did G include the Parastatals (10~h Government share- 
holding) as part of the "state sectorsn but, since wages and conditions of 
service are similar, I have computed an overall "state sectors" figure from those 
of "Central Government", "Local G~vernment~~, llEducationll, "Electricity and Water" 
(1976: 2) and 1500 for the Botswana Meat Commission, subtracted from 
"Manufacturing" - this latter figure is estimated from Manpower and Employment in 
Botswana (1973: 11, 187). 
(25) This is a rough estimate, which attempted to get the best figures from three 
sources: The Selebi-Phikwe Census, April 1975 (1976 : Tables 13-17) ; the Selebi- 
Phikwe Labour Office's figuxes from their survey in August 1976; personal 
interviews of nearly every employing organization by the author in 1976. 
(26) Derived from Employment Survey, August 1975 (1976: 4) and rounded to the nearest 
percent. The State Sector = "Central and Local Government" (including the 
"Industrial classw), "Education" and "Electricity and Water". No better breakdown 
is possible, though here, as before, the "Non-State Sector" includes a few state- 
owned organizations. 
(27) Obtained from the breakdown of the 2432 BCL lllocalll employees' employment cards, 
Personnel Department records, February 1976, and correlated with the Bama~lgwato 
Concessions Limited Local Ehployees Wage Schedule - 1st July 1975. 
(28) cf Report of the (Guvernment) Salaries Review Commission, 1974. 
(29) See correspondence between 24th September 1969 and 18th March 1970 in File number 
7, "Township 196811, of Shashe Project Management Unit collection. It is to the 
Governmentfs credit that the National Development Plan 197578 stresses the mixing 
of areas in future planning. 
( 30) Information from BCL Housing Department. 
( 31) In Phikwe , chiefly dressmakers and skin curers ; builders, thatchers, fencers , 
carpenters; watch, shoe, bicycle, moto=car repairers; metal workers; witch 
doctors. All information from interviews and participant observation. 
(32) Interviews with the Batswana traders of stratum c showed a large proportion of 
their profits being invested in cattle, not additional stock. 
(33) The question of where the migrants that go to the South African mines come from 
could alter this - but initial impressions suggest they come from the same sort 
of areas as Phikwe miners come from (and the latter had often been in the South 
African mines as well). 
(34) This is because the converse (obtained from interviews) holds, viz that skilled 
workers predominate in the township area, and these skilled workers tend to come 
from farther afield, particularly the south-east. 
References 
Bamngwato Concessions Limited (1975), "Local Employees Wage Schedule - 1st Julyl1, mimeo. 
Budget Speech (1977). Botswana Daily News, March 8. 
Chiepe, Dr G. K. T. (1975): "Inter-Regional Political and Economic Cooperation in the 
Light of the Treaty of Lomel1, National Institute for 
Research in Development and African Studies ~ocumentation 
Unit, Discussion Paper No. 1, November, Gabarone. 
Cooper, Diane (1976) : "Trade Unions in Botswana: the Selebi-Phikwe case", 
unpublished paper, Sociology Department, University of 
Cape Town. 
Chambers, R., and Feldman, D. (1973) : Report on Rural Development (Gaborone: Government 
Printer) 
Employment Survey, August 1975 (1976) (~aborone : Government printer) 
Guardian (1977) llMarshall plan for Africaf1 - May 13. 
Ghai, D. P. (1971) A Low Term Wages Policy for Botswana (Gabarone: Government 
Printer) 
Halpern, J. (1965) South Af ricat S Hos t w s  (Middlesex : Penguin ~ooks) 
Henderson, W. (1974) "Independent Botswana: a Reappraisal of Foreign Policy 
Optionsl1, African Affairs, 73 (290), 37-49. 
Lewis, H. L. (1974) "The Theory and Practice of Direct Foreign Investmen$ in 
Less Developed Countries - a study of copper-nickel m i n i n g  
in Botswanats, unpublished MA thesis, University of Cape 
Town. 
Manpower and. Employment in Botswana (1973) : (~abarone : Government printer) 
Master Agreement Between the Republic of Botswana anti Bamangwato Concessions Limited 
and Botswana RST Limited and BCL (sales) Limited (1972). 
File No. Sua 10/4, Shashi Project Agreements, Sua Project 
Management Unit collection, Gaborone. 
National Development Plan 1973-78 (1973) : (Gabomne : Government printer) 
National Policy on Incomes, Employment, Prices and Profits (1972) : Government Paper 
No. 2, March. Mimeo. 
013th (1972) Feature article on Selebi-Phikwe, June, 62-78. 
Ostrander, F. Taylor (1974) l'Botswana Nickel-Copper: a Case Study in Private 
Investmentts Contribution to Economic Developmentll, 
pp. 524-549 in John Barratt, Simon Brant, David S. Collier 
and Kurt Glaser (eds) , Accelerated Development in Southern 
Africa  ondo don: Macmillan Press Ltd) 
Peri-Urban Survey (1974) A Social and Economic Survey in Three Peri-Urban Areas in 
Botswana, 1974 (Gaborone: Government Printer) 
Puisana Selebi-Phikwe Newspaper (1972). "A Hi& Price to Payf1, October 30. Copy in 
Botswana Christian Council Library, Selebi-Phikwe. 
Report of the Census of Selebi-Phikwe (1976): (Gaborone: Government printer) 
Report of the Population Census 1971 (1972) : (Gaborone: Government printer) 
Report of the Salaries Review Commission (1974). Copy in Selebi-Phikwe Town Clerkfs 
Off ice. 
Report of the Wages Council for Ening Industry (1973). Copy in Botswana High Commission 
Library, London. 
Rural Income Distribution Survey in Botswana 1974/75 (1976): (~aborone: Govt. printer) 
Shashe Project Management Unit collection. Selebi-Phikwe Planning Records, File No. 7, 
lfTownship 196811, Gaborone. 
Silitshena, R. M. K. (1976a): "Mining and the Econorqy of Botswana1', National Institute 
for Research in Development and African Studies 
Documentation Unit, Working Paper No. 8, September, 
Gaborone. 
11 If (1976b): Informal paper presented to the National Migration Study 
Committee meeting, October 15, Gaborone. 
Smit, P. (1970) : 
Botswana. A Short Political History  ondo don: Methuen 
and Co. Ltd.) 
Botswana. Resources and Development (~retoria : Africa 
Institute of South Africa) 
Sociolgical and Housing Attitudes Studies for Planning of Dukwe Township (1975): 
(Gaborone: Government Printer) 
Speech by His Ekcellency the President, Sir Seretse Khama, addressing workers at Selebi- 
Pikwe , 19th December 1975 : (Gaborone : Government printer) 
Stephens, B. (1976) : Gaborone Migration Survey - December 1975. National 
Institute for Research and Development and African Studies 
Documentation Unit, Working Paper No. 6, June, Gaborone. 
Sweeeey, P. M. (1974) : "Chile: the Question of Powerf1, pp. 11-21 in Paul M. 
Sweezey and Harry Magdoff (eds) , Revolution and Counter- 
Revolution in Chile  ondo don: Monthly Review Press) 
Town Plan,n_ing Repore for Selebi-Phiee towns hi^: - , Addendum (1970) : Report by Sir 
Alexander Gibb and Partners. Copy in Town Clerk's 
Office, Selebi-Phikwe. 
Vanhanen, H. (1976): "Population Growth and Socio-Economic Characteristics of 
Gaborone", unpublished paper for Gaborone Growth Study, 
Working Paper A-l. 
Watermaul, P. (1975) : lrThe lLabour Aristocracy~ in Africa: introduction to an 
unfinished controversyf1, South Labour Bulletin, 2 (5), 
10-27. 
World Bank (1972) : Loan and Guarantee Agreements. File No. Sua 10/4, Shashe 
Project Agreements, Sua Project Management Unit, 
Gaborone. 
